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150 The Political Economy Of The Libyan Revolution And The 'magaanimity' Of fhe Western powers
billions of dollars to save Libyans when its major countries are embroiled in economic
crisis? The answer lies in the strategic importance of post-Gad d,afiLibyainthe matrix ofNATO's military and economic inierest.
From Protest to Revolution: Arab Spring and the Internal Dynamics of the LibyanRevolution
The Libyan revolution did not have the trappings and finesse of painsrahngplanning, mobllization and execution often associated *ih.orr,.* porarystrategies ofregime change. It was a product of domino effect which originaied frt- s,ri.rr.,recorded in the political upheavais which have been dubbeJthe Arab spring. Theuprisings pitched the people against the sit-tight, autocratic and pseudo-monlrchist
regimes and produced some startlingly positive results in Tunisia and Egypt. The
success of the uprisings provided a beacon.of hope and energizedattempts atiplicating
them in many countries with identical socio-economic confi"gurations. The successes ofthe Tunisian and Egyptian revoiutions served u, u ,.-"p1ate that motorized theaspiration for a new political order in Libva.
Despite the successful ousting oi Tunisian President, ZineElAbidine Ben Alithrough mass protests, there was a note of ambivalence in extant anaiyses about thecapacity of Arab countries to follorv the Tunisian example and dismantle thepaternalistic and monarchical regrmes that urere their trademark. It was generally
believed that the long years of politrcal margi nalizationof the masses, contraction of thepolrtical space, intolerance of opposition and personalization of state apparatuses offorce had enfeebled rhe masses. based on thai, Hardy (2011) opines rrr",,rr. 
"g.i"gaulocrats in the Arab countries would "ciing more tightty to power rather thanrehntlursllng it". The high prospects of ,tut.-rporrorJd iesisturrce based on theperYading culfure of intolerance, which manifests in harsh and ruthless suppression ofdissersion Ied Leyne (2011) to contend that "if Tunisia is to be the first oia series ofdominos, the first of many Arab autocracies to collapse, there is no sign yet of the
contagi-on spreading to Egypt". But this was later to be proved wrong. Bgvpt went up in
flames following a popular upris ingthatbegan on Tuesday, 25 lanuary 2afi .
Several factors underpinned the perception thai the Tunisiin upheaval was aciose-circuited political occurrence th;t tacked spill-over capabiliry. The socio-
economic formation in most Arab nations were characterizea by irigh level of p;.rtilow educational levels, docility as a result of years of suppression, strong governmental
control of the society_ and extreme personali zatioi of the militaiyl police andintelligence agencies (Hauslohner zOllj. The success of the mass uprising in Tunisia
and Egypt in dethronin g.the 23-year reign of President Ben A1i and t'he 30-Iyear regimeof President Hosni Mubarak was not the sole catalyst that undergirded the Li|yanrevolution although it provided inspiration and. alted, as a refeience point. ihepeculiarities of the anti-state -ass uciiorrs that played out in Tunisia urra tgypt *e..
embedded in the fact that they did not derive theii raison d'€rre or mo toizingrlia, no-
ethnic, religious or sectional sloganeering, or assistance from f*.,g""fi;;'",
demagogued by an inspiring leader figure. It was a revolution of the i.opt., by thepeople and for the people and which was powered, driven and sustainedby the -urr.,based on their collective desire for a better society.
Several domestic contradictions acted as push factors thatmobllized the masses
against the government of Colonel Muammer Giddafi. These included: closed political
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system as a result of the personaiization of statecraft, unemployment, corruption, lack
of infrastrucfural facilities, worsening economic conditions and state terrorism of the
people. Despite the creation of elaborate committees which painted the fagade of
decentralized administration in Llbya, Gadda{r was its supreme ruler and brooked no
opposition. The underiying phriosophy, principles and strucfures for statecraft derived
therr essence from Gaddafi's Green Book. The paradox of poiitical reality was that while
Llbyawas officially known as Jamahiriyalt, or state of the masses, the masses had little to
do with political outcomes. As the Freedom House (2003) avers,
Libyans cannot change their government democratically.
Colonel Mu'ammar al Qadhafi rules by decree, with almost no
accountability or transparency. Llbya has no formai
constitution; a mixture of Islamic belief, nationalism, and
socialist theory in Qadhafi's Green Book provides principles
and structures of governance, but the document lacks iegal
status.
Although poiiticai governance in Libya was orgarized around revolutionary
and people's committees which served as piatforms for the administration of the
country's-subdivisions in legislative and executive capacities, Gaddafi remained the
repository and symbol of actual power. The strategies which Gaddafiadopted to rein-in
opposition included: the appointment of relatives and Ioya1 members of his ethnic group
into central military and government positions; skillful malrginalization of ri-vals,
selective empowerment and disempowerment of supporters and rivals to create a
balance of support for his regime, abridgement of academic freedom, censorship of the
media and constant excitation of the patriottc zeal of the peopie (Freedom House 2003;
Craig21ll). The dexterity of the Gaddafi regime in keeping the level of dissension in
the Libyan polity low 1ed to his description by US diplomats as a master of tactical
maneuvering (Crug 201L). In actuality, security concerns about regime survival
especially th e fear of coup d'6tat made Gaddafi to convertLibya into an endless field of
security operations. According to Wikipedia, the Revolutionary Committees
occasionally kept tight conffol over internal dissent; reportedly, ten to twenty percent of
Libyans worked as informants for these committees, with surveillance taking place in
the government, in factories, and in the education sector."
(http : / / euwikipedia. org / wik:, / 20 | 1 Libyan_civil_war) .
Despite the creation of the fagade of invincibility to the outside worid through
anti-west sloganeering and pro-terrorist pronouncements; and internally, by making a
public show of the execution, hanging and mutilation of dissidents, there were cracks in
the elite support base of the government. This crack wtose earliest manifestation is
locatable in iOOO, gradually broadened until it gave way in the course of the mass
protests that eventually ousted Gaddafi. In 2000, Gaddafi dissolved 14 ministries or
general peoplels cornmittees and ffansferred their powers to municipal councils to the
chagrin of those invoived. The move was interprited as a deft. power grab move by
Gaddafi to undermine several of his ministers (Freedom House 2003). ,
Gaddafi fahned the embers of ethnicity and margin alizedtheBastern part of the
country. Whiie Gaddafr extracted oi1 from the Eastern part, he neglected to provide
basic infrastructure such as housing, rpads water and sewage system. Butters (2011)
I
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describes the state of infrastrucfure in the eastern city of Benghazi, the second largest
city in Llbyawith vast oii wealth thus, "the city one of million has one sewage treatment
plant, buiit more than 40 years ago. Waste is just flushed into the ground or1h. sea, and
when the water table rises in winter, the streets become open cesspools". Added to this
was the issue of personal well-being associated with lack of houiing facilities. Butters
(2011) traces the genesis of the subsisting infrastructural crisis, especially in the housing
sector, to Gaddafi's earliest sociaiist economic policies, which alienated private
investments through the dispossession of landlords of their property a;d the
transference of same to their tenants. Not only did this lead to stagnation, it created
crists. The wide-ranging implication was severe, chronic housing shortage, which
induced personal survivai crisis in the young people as they could neither take
possession of their own homes, get married nor start their lives (Butters 2}ll). It was the
cumulative feeling of relative deprivation in Eastern Libya that engendered and
motorized the protests that rapidly transformed into a revolution. In the wider Libyan
society, such factors as ethnic rivalries among senior government officials, massive
corruption, mismanagement and high incidence of unemployment created despair,
which formed the basis for solidarity against the regime. The level of corruptior, *i, ,o
high in the Gaddafi era if one considered the reports of Transparency International. The
Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index for 2010 ranked Llbya 146'n
out of 178 countries surveyed. Also, the level of unemployment which was put at20.74
percent and the inctdence of poverty rvhich was estimated to envelope about one-third
of the T.ibyan population as they hved below national poverty line ail provided the
fodder for mass action (Transparency Internation al2010; Reuters z0og) .
Despite the potentiality of these push factorsto catalyzeanti-government revolt,
Gaddafi's reputation as a ruthless leader who spared no expense in punishing dissidents,
his machinery of intelligence network, loyal polic e, and elite militaiy machine
exclusively loyal to him proved a daunting disincentive to confront his regime. But the
disenchantment in the Libyan state proved gteater incentive. Thus, from protest, the
anti-government sentiments took on the form of upnsing, then revolt ind fina11y
revolution. What added fi1lip to the mass revolt was the unexpected support from top-
ranking government and military officials through resignation, renunciation of the
regime and defection to the mass movement. It wouid appear that the speed with which
these officials defected to the oppositior and their apparent lack of consideration of the
dangers that their political position portended for them represented pay-back time for
Gaddafi for the festering "Maradonic" play-offs against them. The Justice MinisteE
Mustafa Mohammed Abud A1 Jeleil, the Interior Minister, Major General Abdul Fatah
Younis, the Prosecutor-General, Abdul-Rahman al-Abbar resigned their positions and
joined the opposition. The Foreign Minister, Musa Kusa and his Oil Ministry
counterpart, Shukri Ghanem withdrew their support for the regime and fled Llbya,
with the former pitching his tent in rhe United Kingdom (UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Off,rce 2011; Al lazeera 2011; Abdelatti and Werr 2011). Libya's
diplomatic missions also collapsed under the weight of the opposition as the
ambassadors to the Arab League, European Union and United Nations, and to such
countries as Austraiia, BangTadesh, Belgium, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysra,
Nigeria, Portugal, Sweden and the US amongst others renounced the Gaddafi regime
and formally resigned. The same wind of renunciation of the Gaddafi regime blew into
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the army leading to the defection of high-ranking military officials in the tfuee arms of
the military.
The genesis of the Libyan protests that metamorphosed into a revolution lacked
precise periodisation as they were organized inpockets around the country for different
prrpor.r. But the peaceful protest march which started on the 15'n of February 2011
appeared to have spawned the anti-government protests that mushroomed in major
cities of Ltbya and blossomed into a revolution. Prior to 15" February, protesters had,
between 13'n and 16'n January 2077 , taken over the cities of Bayda, Darnah, Benghazt
and Bani Walid, to protest the undue delays in the completion of subsidized housing
units undertaken by the government. Although the Libyan government responded to the
housing unrest by January 27,2011 by setting up a US$24 billion investment fund to
provide housing, the protesters were aheady implacable and demanded the end of the
regime (Reuters 201I). The 15'n February protest which started inBenghazi was in
protest of the arrest of a human rrghts lawyer, Fathi Terbil who was also the lawyer and
spokesman to a cross-section of the families of 7,270 prisoners massacred by security
forces at the Abu Salim Prison rn1996. The protesters, estimated to be berween 500 and
2000 were violently dispersed by the Benghazi Police with water cannons, tear gas and
rubber bullets. Similar protests spontaneously broke out in other cities with high
casualty rate (Economist 20 1 1 ).
The response of the Gaddafi regime to festering protests across the country
consisted of carrot and stick. It announced the release of 1 10 suspected Islamic militants
and the doubling of state employees' salaries (Cowe11 20 1 1 ). The regime, in keeping with
its autocratic credentials sought to psychologicaliy weaken the resolve of the protesters
by iabeling them "cockroaches" and "rats" and ordering the use of force to disperse
them (Economist 201 1). When this failed to work against the revolt, the regime resorted
to force by employing snipers, mercenaries, helicopter gunships, war planes and anti-
aircraft weaponry for the massacre of the demonstrators (Ir4eo 2011). But the resolve of
the masses to fight to the end defied the seeming superior fire power of the regime as
events. It was not until February 27" thatthe protesters formalized their opposition by
establishing the nationai Transitional Council (NTC). Several factors dictated the
imperative of formalizing the struggle through a recognizable body: one, the need to
consolidate opposition efforts; two, the need to have an organizing platform to
coordinate the pockets of resistance efforts looseiy scattered in different cities and
towns; three, to create a central agency that will give a political face to the struggle
(Aljazeera 2011b); four, the necessity of a central negotiating agency on behalf of the
opposition in order to sustain the struggle at home and attract international attention
and assistance; and five, to create an alternative to Gaddafi's repressive regime.
Anti-Western Sentiments and the N atiolo;alttzation of the Culture of Defiance
Libya was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1911 when it feli into the imperial
control of Italy. During the World War II, British and French forces occupied it and in
the course of the post-war negotiations as a result of its trusteeship status under the
United Nations, it gained independence in 195 1 and was ruled by pro-western monarch,
King Idris I. King Idris I ruled Libya untlt 1969 when Colonel Mu'ammar Abu Minyar
al-Gaddafi,then}7 years oid, led a group of army offrcers and toppled the monarch. The
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coup led to far-reaching changes in the socio-political structudng of the country as it
aboiished the institution of monarchy as the organizing governmental system and the
Libyan constitution as the grundnorm of governmental authority. The Libyan
constitution was replaced with laws based on the political philosophy and ideology
expounded in Gaddafi's multivoiume treatise, The Green Book,whtchwas described as a
fusion of Arab nationalism, socialism and Islam (Freedom House 2008).
The underiying economic thinkrng of Gaddafi and one whrch seemingly
powered the coup was the dismantling of Western domination of the oil economy.
According to Freedom House (2008), 'Al-Qadhafi believed that foreign oil companies
were profiting from the country's natural-resource weaith at the expense of the Llbyan
people, and he moved to nationaltze o1l assets, claiming that oii revenues would be
ifrui.a among the population". Gaddafi adopted anti-Western poiicies and with the
enormous resources accruing from oil, pursued apan-Arab foreign policy. He went on a
spending spree, buying military hardware, that by l979,Llbyawas reputed to own more
fighterplanes than Great Britain (Poggioli 201 1).
Regulation did not stop in the economic sphere, it permeated all sectors of
national 1iie. In the political arena, dissent was illegal under Law 15 of 1973 and
punishment for founding a politic al party or ertgaglrrg in political activities considered
ffeasonous was execution (Eljahmi 2006; Freedom House 2003). Up to mid-1980s,
Libya's intelligence service conducted assassination of Libyan dissidents around the
*oita and as late as 2004, bounties were placed on a Libyan journalist domiciled in the
United Kingdom (Eljahmr 2006).
The regime made serious efforts to regulate the flow of information especially
from the West. The state owned and controlled all media outfits inciuding their news
content and programming. In underscoring the iack of freedom in the media sector,
Freedom House (2003) avers that aithough access to Western news channels such as the
CNN was available, foreign programming was sometimes censored. In addition,
international publications were censored and sometimes prohibited and tnternet access
was provid.a Uy a service company owned by Gaddafi's son. In the course of the
revolution, internet communication was shut down (Ackerman 2011). As part of the
anti-Western poiicies of the Gaddafi regime, foreign languages such English and French
were, until reiently, banned from school syllabus and discussions with foreigners about
politics carried a prison term of three years (The Economist 201 1b). lnterestingiy, while
Gaddafi outlawed foreign languages, his children schooled in the West and speak such
languages, which they must have learnt in Libya prior to travelling abroad.
Where Gaddafi's anti-Western policies earned him world-wide condemnation
was his support for terrorist groups and belligerence against his neighbors. On the last
point, Gaddafi clashed with regional neighbors such as Chad over the Aozou strip and
ggyp, over their common border (Freedom House 2003). Gaddaf,r's links with terrorist
atiaiks worldwide led to the imposition of unilateral sanctions against his regime by the
US government in 1981. The US followed this up in 1986 with the bombing of several
miliiary targets, including Gaddafi's home. In 1988, Gaddafi' sponsored an attack on
pan Am Flight 103 which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotiand and killed all the 259
passengers on board as weli as 1 1 residents of the town. He was also fingered in the 1989
tombing of a French airiiner, UTA F1ight 772, over Niger rvhich killed 170 people.
Based on the Pan Am Fiight bombing, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Libya.
[i[
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It was not until 1999 thatGaddafi handed over the two suspects indicted in the bombing
fortrialin Scotland.
The major fallout of the Pan Am Flight affair, apart from international
sanctions was Gaddafi's political reorientation and transition from pan-Arabism to pan-
Africanism. Under the auspices of his new pan-African preoccupation, Gaddafi
worked with Egypt in a peace plan for Sudan in 2001, mediated over dtsputes between
Sudan and Uganda and in 2003 sent troops to protect President Ange Felix Patasse of
Central Afica Republic foilowing a falled coup d'6tat. Gaddafi's African focus which
was anchored on a vision of a unified African state dictated his involvement in the
African Union (AU) and the formation of New Partnership for Africa's Development
(I.{EPAD). On the part of African States, they responded to Gaddafi's pan-African
policy by nominating Libya to chair the UN Commission on Human Rights rn2003
(Freedom House 2003).
Dismantling the Gaddafi Mystique: The Beginning of the End
From the outset of his successful coup d'6tat in 7969, Colonel Gaddafi created a
mystery around himself, not just in Libya but internationally. His regime used the
weapon of propaganda effectively in challenging Western imperialism and projecting
pan-Arab inteiest which was Gaddafi's initial preoccupation before events ied to a
political about-turn that aligned him to pan-African activism. Gaddafi's Pan-Arab
activism had consisted of supporting extremist groups in Palestine and Syria and his
imperialist ambition to set up a federation of Arab and Muslim states in North Africa.
The manifestations of Gaddafi's anti-western orientation found expression in: his
friendship with USSR leader, Leonid Brezhnev and Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, a
friendship the US Central lnteliigence Agency (CIA) described as "unholy trinity" (HP-
Time.com and Taibot 1982); his program to fund the establishment of nuclear power
plants; his occupation of uranium-rich Chad, which was interpreted as a precursor to,
and important teil-ta1e sign of, Libya's nuciear power prograr.,;l; and, his professed
support for such diverse terrorist groups as the Red Army Faction (RAF) of Germany;
the Red Brigade of Italy and the lrish Republican Army (IRA) of Ireland.
Afterthe 1985 Rome and Vienna airport attacks that kil1ed 19 and wounded over
140 persons, the Libyan government reinforced tts categortzation as a terrorist supporter
when it described the attacks as "heroic operations carried out by the sons of the martyrs
of Sabra and Shatila" (http:/ / en witrapedia.org/wlkt/ Abu-Nida1). Subsequentiy, such
incidents as the Gulf of Sidra maneuvers between Libya and the US, and the April 5,
1986 bombingof the La BelleNight ClubinWest Berlin rvhichkilledthree andrnjured229
people out of which the US recorded two deaths and 63 casualties rgnrted a chord of
retaliation in the US. On April 15, 1986, the US massivelv attacked military targets in
Benghazi and Tripoli. Despite US rationalization of the attack on the basis of self-
defense in accordance with Article 51 of the LIN Charter, the UN General Assembly in
its 78'n plenary session through resolution 41 / 38 of 20 November 1986 condemned the
US aerialandnavalmilitaryattacks againstLibya(LTN GeneralAssembly 1986).
Gaddafi's seeming invincibility was sustained by four factors: one, his anti-
Western activities placed him on the front burner of US foreign policy in the Middle
East. During Ronald Reagan's presidency', Gaddafi was declared US public enemy No. i
rll
I
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and was nicknamed the "mad dog of the Middle East" (Bowmar' z0ll ; Memmot 20l l);
two, the enormous resources which accrued to his country from oil and his effective
insuiation of the h+crative oii industry from western control; three, his fabled arsenal
which is chock full of weapons, inciuding suspicion of nuclear power capabiliry.
Gaddafi bought thousands of tanks, armored vehicles and cannons, hundreds of atrcraft
and submarines. He also stored 1,000 metric tons of Semtex, a key element of terrorist
bombs in the 1980s (Poggioli 2011); and four, his defiance of the West and his survivai of
their covert and open operations to either topple or assassinate him, especially the 1986
bombing of Gaddaft's residence.
Pnor to the 1986 US attack on Libya, the US had sought to break Gaddafi
severally but unsuccessfully. Shortly after his inauguration as US president, Ronald
Reagan ordered the expulsion of Libyan diplomats from Washington following reports
that Libyan assassination teams were targeting US envoys abroad. Secondly, in the
course of US Naval exercises off the coast of Llbya, US warplanes shot down fwo
Libyan aircrafts, which they deemed to be athreat. Thirdly, the US stepped up economic
pressure, barring exports of aircraft parts. Bowman (2011) captures the mood in
Washington thus, "through it all, Gaddafi remained firmly in power, and the president
grew more annoyed".
The process for the dismantling of the Gaddafi mystique commenced with US
unilateral sanctions, foilowed by the 1986 US bombing, and perfected by the UN
sanctions as a result of the Pan Am Flight bombing in 1988. Not only was he isolated by
the Arab Leagae, tlne far-reaching sanctions imposed by the IIN added teeth to the US
sanctions that began in 1981 thus, reducing Libya to a pariah state from 1992. Davies
(1990:183) asserts that the US air strikes on land targets in Libya brought it to,its lowest
point in 77 years considering that ordinary citizens boldly criticized and even defaced
Gaddafi's posters. And it would be right to assert with the aid of hindsight that this
period signaied the disintegration of Gaddafi's invincibility.
The sanctions against Libya were comprehensive as they tatgetedhis power bases:
the oil industry, the economy and the military. The UN sanctions, which came through
the UN Security Council Resolutions 731of 2I January 1992 and748 of 31March1992
were in reaction to Libya's non-compliance with requests relating to investigations into
the bombingof PanAm Flight 103 and UTA Flight772.Llbya specifically refused to
extradite Libyan nationals accused of masterminding these attacks. The IIN Security
Council Resolution 7 48 derivingits impetus from Chapter VII of the UN Charter set out
the sanctions against Libya to include:
a) Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory
if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of Libya except on
signifi cant humanitarian grounds.
b) Prohibit the supply of any aircraft or aircraft.components to Libya including the
provision of engineering and maintenance servicing, certification of air
worthiness, payment of new claims against existing insurance contracts and the
provision of new direct insurance for Lib yan aircraft.
c) Prohibit any provision to Libya of arms and related material including the sale
or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military and paramilitary police
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vehicles and equipment and spare parts.
d) Prohibit any provision to Libya of technical advice, assistance or training
related to the aforementioned issues.
e) Withdraw any state officials or agents present in Libya to advise the Libyan
authorities on military matters.
0 Significantly reduce the number and the level of the staff atLlbyandiplomatic
missions and consular posts and restrict and control the movement within their
territory of such staff who remain.
g) Prevent the operation of all Libyan Arab Airline offices.
h) Take ai1 appropriate steps to deny entry to or expel Libyan nationals who have
been denied entry to or expelled from other stets because of their involvement in
rerrorist activities.
Libya's indifference and defiance of the UN sanctions prompted LIN Security
Council Resolution 883 of 11 November 1993, which expanded the horizon of
sanctions. Resolution 883 which took effect from 1 December 1993 strengthened earlier
sanctions by requesting every country to freezeLibyan funds or other financial resources
in their territory except funds or other financial resources derived from the sale or supply
of petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas and gas products and agricultural
products; and prohibiting the sale, marketing or licensing of large pumps and motors
used for transporting oil and gas, equipment for oi1 terminais, refining equipment and
necessary accessories and spare parts.
The impact of the sanctions on Libya was enormous as it stalled its economy and
reversed its deveiopment trajectory. The Libyan mission to the UN in a September
report to the then IIN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali about the impact of the
sanctions on Libya avers,
The substantial damage caused in the humanitarian, economic
and social spheres bv the coercive and unjust measures taken
against the Libyan Arab people under Security Council
resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) continues to worsen day
by day. In addition, all tnfrastructure development programmes
and plans have been adversel-v affected, thereby dashing the
hopes and aspirations of the Libyan Arab people to achieve
progress, well-being, development, stability, security and peace
(http : / / www.ge ocities. c o m / athens / 87 44 / imp act. htm).
Llbyarecorded serious reversals in its economic foffunes during its period of
international isolation. Most of the effects of the sanctions were still palpable till the end
of Gaddafi's regime. Between 1992 and 1995, Llbya's healthcare sector virtually
collapsed. Apart from increase in the number of avoidable deaths, there was sharp
increase in the morbidrty and mortality rate of diseases. Aiso, there was acute shortage
in the availabiiity of medical specialists. Financial losses rn the health and social weifare
sector were estimated to be in the neighborhood of US$180, 800,000; agriculrure and
animal husbandry, us$5,982,249,782; transportation and communication,
US$l,157,523,500; industry and mining, US$4,150,677,942; finance and. trade,
I
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US$4,257,000,000; 
.arLd. ene.rgy "o*plliLg petroleum and electriciry US$3 billion(http : / / www.se ociti e s. co m / itlens / ti7 44 / i^;;;-.i;;i. - "
In the face of economic stagnation und e.osio., of the quality of life of Libyanswith likely consequences of internarrevort, theLibyii gor.rrr.,"rr, ,ook steps in 1999 toexit international is.olation thr ough a rapp.ochement w]th washington. He surrenderedthe t\vo Llbyannationals srrspe.t.d of trri Lockerbie bombing and reached agreementsto pay compensation to the famiiies of the victims or totn trre Fan Am and ufa riigir,,one of these suspects, Abdel Basset Ari Mohamed 
"t-]l,1r"iin, 
was found guilty white
llt^gtltt was acquitted. Although Al-Megrahl'r upf.ur ulutst his conviction faiied in2002'he was released 
tg-", scottish prison on compassionate grounds due to a terminaliilness and returned to Libya on Auglst 19 , 2009 fB"r." "i N;ar Easrern Anairs io r r y.on April 30,2003, tt,eLibyangoi.rr-..rt accepted responsibitty for the Lockerbiebombing and set up.a.fuldtotutlingus$ 2.7 tiuion a i-p.rrrate vicrims' families.under the deal an initial us $4 ,ii[io., *""id t;-;"iJii. each victim once u.N.sanctions ended' That would be followed by another us Sa -imon if the united stateslifted its sanctions andby us $2 million if it droppe iLiai"*"m rhe u.s. list of statesponsors of terrorism (B_BC 2003; cM.v 200a).-inA"g; 2003, Libyarurguea"treremaining IrN Security Council Resolutions r.qlr.-e"Is u.ra tne IrN sanctior, *.rJlifted on Septembet,12,2003. Also, the U.s. Interirationd rmergency Economic powersAct (IEEPA)-based sanctions were iifted on septemb;-;0, 2004 (Bureau of NearEastern Affairs 2Ol.l). O-n January g,2OO4,Libya signe a usilOmillion compensationdeal with the families of 170 p.opt. kill.ed in the uo'muing-or a French airliner, urAFlrght. In 2008, Libya and thi united states ,G";t;;;il;ensarion deaL for Liiyu,victims of American attacks against Libya urrd A-.rican victims of allegedlibyanreprisals, pavingthe way for fuI1 normalization of ties between the two countries. Thedeal covered 26 lawsuits filed by American citizens againsi inyuand three by Lib;;;citizets against the US terrorist actions committed igainstthem (Tripoti post 200g;Bureau of NearEasternAffairs 201 1).
The next factor that demystified Gaddafi and, opened the gate for NAro,spreemptive support for the revolution was its uct"at t rowte?ge of Gaddafi,s aiminish"edmilitary strength and capabrliry knowredge which *ui-6irr.rJ,hr;;;h ;.;;r,inspection of Libya- It was this iame strateg:y that was ,rr.ffi western powers againstsaddam Hussein and which led to his capture and death. -prior to the program ofweapons inspection, Gaddafi was reputed to possess arror-o* arsenal 0f weaponsincluding chemical weapons. Libya hud in it, ballistic missilearsenai: Scud Bs (300-lnn,7.9!!qp"4"ad) acquired from former Sovier union, a handfuGr Nortrr rorean scud cs(600-km, 700 kg payioad) and a 500-700km laflgemissile under development, called A1Fatah' There were also disputed rgqdts ,t ur .:ity"t uifi0ltn range Dong missilesfrom North Korea (squassbni and i'eickkertrzou,i-st ;;;;". r9 Decemb er 2003,
1,'-[llibva announced its preparedness to aiandon iir *.ufo", of mass destruction
S{,MDI program, it. inadvertently commerced.the proce's; til illil;;irr.international perceptio-" gf its military .capability. tn actuatty, that proces, *u,inevitable considering the impacts of the irt.-uiiorr"il;"r"rin" on Libyals corporatesurvival. As Indyk(2004) observes, - ----:'.
Back then, \!bV" was facing a deepening economic crisisproduced by disastrous economic poiicies urr"a *ir-u*g;;;;
Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of Political Science . Vot. 3 No.1, 
Aug' 2012 159
of its oi1 revenues' United Nations and U S sanctions that
prevented ilivu importing oilfield technology Sudq .'t
impossible for Mt' Ciaaffito expand 9i]-grgd3ction' The only
way out was to seek rapprochement with Washington'
NATO, Operation Unified Protector and the Nexus of Interests
TheLibyanrevolutionofficiallystartedoni5FebruaryZ}llbltby26February
2011, the IIN Security Council Resolution 1970. Resolution 1970 imposed 
tough
measures against the Libyan regime as an expression of- 
its grave concern about the
situation in the counfy u, *"t uJ.ondemnation of the vioience and use of force agalrlst
civilians. It was utro urr"frored on the need to protect imocent 
civilians and take care of
the humani taflaficrisis associated with such crises. The resolution 
was tatgeted against
the regime of Gaddafi and its immediate aim was to secure 
a ceasefire which was only
achievable through the exitbf Gaddafi from Libyan presidency' 
The measures adopted
by the resolution included: the referral of the situation in 
Llbyasince 1 5 February 201 1 '
to the International Criminal Court (ICC); imposition of alms-embargo; 
imposition of
travel ban and assets freeze(UN SecuritylCouncit 2011)' 
On March l7 2011' the IIN
Security Council orr.Jn"rolutiol 1973 whichnot only strengthened 
Resolutionl971'
but expanded the h;;"; of its-sanctions. NATS i"t *p it military forces under
operation flnifea rroteirto protect civilians. Resolution 1973 speciftcaily 
provided for
concerted efforts to protect civilians and therefore imposed 
ano-f|y zone' The aim of no-
fly zoneprovision *^, a protect civiiians and civilian-populated areas from 
attack ot
threat of attack. N":fIy ;;e implied the closure of LiUyan airspace to designated
aircrafts, especialty 
"riii1rrv "it.ruftr. 
What the no-fly zone a-1so meant in practice was
the empowermenr of NATb forces to engagein 1ir stnkes on Libyan 
ground troops and
warships identified as attacking civiliani. itt. US Secretary of State' Hiilary Clinton'
was quoted as saying that no-fly zone- would "require certain 
actions taken to protect the
planes and pilots,'including bombing targeis like the Libyan defence 
systems"
(Newstatesman20l l).
Despite the pioliferation of crises in the whole of }4iddle East, 
it was only in
Libya that the westJin fowers reacted. swiftly and devoted 
enormous resources' Why
would this be ,oU Wurlip"rely humanitarianconcern that motorized 
NATO's military
campaign in Llbya?O-, #u, it -erely a ploy to overthrow the 
last bastion of anti-Western
regime that was standing againstits ..ono*i. interest? Prior to Libyan cn^sis'3:1t-*"t
;;; i" 12 countrie, urid iR., the eruption crisis in Libya; two more countnes were
"rgarff.a 
in crisis. In ail these countries, extreme force was used against 
the protesters'
Apart from isolate; ;;";";atiofl,_there were no concerted efforts to 
address the so-
called humanitari;;;;;"; and'halt turther deterioration of human condition in
those countries.
under the cloak of protecting civilians, the unoffrcial mandate 
of NATO was to
provide mifltar, bactirrg tli6e r"uotitionaries'to ac1oalt,ethe goal of ousting 
Gaddafi'
It was never in d;;;-?h; w*rat trre Western powe6 wanted was the overthrow of
Gaddafi. All policies adopted natio-nally i;J iryiqgrionaliy by Western countries 
were
gearedtowards the act,tiization of that objective. Even be{gre the 
resolution on no-fly
zone was adopted b;il; UN iecoriry Council, France had insistedthat Gaddafi must
go alld the uS N;;i F"r;., t ua urr"uay positioned their aircraft carrier, the t/ss
ll!
S/N C Funds As at
1 Canada CAD$ 50 million October 20112 France us$ 413 million October 2011a
J US$ 940 million June 201 1
United US$ 333 million
BPS 212 million
October 2011
5 US 1.1 billion
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S ource : Wikipedia Encyclopedia,
The'magnanimiry' Of The Western powersLibyan Revolution And
Enterprise off the coast of Llbya. Also, by March 2"0 2011, the Royar Canadian Navyfrigate HMCS Charloffetown yia alreaiy 6een deploy.a io'trr. Medirerranean, off thecoastofLibya.(http://en.wikipedia.org/wlki/zoti_^l;Lry_l.rr.rr.rtion 
in_Libya).NATo's magnanimity was noicompletely altruistic or entirely driven by themoral burden of the consequences of inactio. i, tir. ru.e oiCuadafi,s threat to show nomercy to those in the rebel-controlled city of-Benghaiiiil- and Hosfor d,20lr:z).Embedded in its human itarianconcerns was the hig:h economics of unfettered access toresources woridwide. Amongst the trouble spots-in tt. lriaat. e"r, ura vrughr.rregion, ir was only in Llbya that NATo directiy intervenej. Th. ,.uror, ray inthe factthatLlbyanleadership under Gad'dafiwith its tiaditional anti-western policies did notfit into the matrix of western interest. The implicatio, or trri, *as that despite Gaddafi,soverarching gestures especially, the condemnation of terrorism and dismantling of hisweapons of mass destruction (wMD), he was stiu perceiveJuv trr. west as dangerousand, therefore, expendable.
The NAT. campaign was principalry driven by economic and militaryconcerns which were central to the continued aorrrirruiio.r'of the globai economy bywestern countries. And these concerns *oriaoJv;;r;;iy a friendly regime. whileLlbya was considered strategic in the realizatioior tn.r. .o.rcerns, Gadd.aftwith hisunpredictability and well-known anti-western foreign pori.y *r, not. The importanceattached to these con-cerns underpinned the enormous capitai outlay that characterizedNATO operations in Libya as shown by Table 1 . 
*Lr@J L,dL vlrdtdcLerTz
Table 1: Funds spentbyMajorpowers inNATo operations inLibya
hnp : / / en.wikip e di a. o rg / w iki / 20 11 _military_intervention_in_L ibya)
NATO did not want to risk the prolongation of the war especially, in the face ofEurozone economic crisis and domestic rrl.rt, hence its proactive military campaigns(see statistics in Table 2).Therelative lack of sophisticatio" ura organization as well asthe atomization of rebel groups meant that the necessary momenfum to end the war in aforeseeable timeframe was dfficuIt. And considering Gaddafl/s strength militarily, themost likely outcome would be defeat or stalemate. D"efeat was unthinkable as it wouldhave led to regional instability, inciuding massive_wau. or r.n g.es that would adverselyaffect Europe considering Libya's proxlmity (Gheciu zotl,-fy'A staiemate was wharNATO least expected as it would d-efinitely create more-proui.-, than the revolutionoriginally intended to achieve. one, a staiemate *orta increase the burden of
4
United States September 201t
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responsibility to midwife a peaceful transition to a post-Ga ddafi'Libya' The implication
is that additional resource;would be needed. Two, it would create pockets of enclaves
likely to selve as breeding spots for militant and criminal groups; three, these militant
and criminal groups .orrLd iorru.rt themselves into a reserve army of mercenaries and
thus, commoJify vrolence and instabiliry in North Africa and the Middle East; and four,
with fisca1 constraint and war fatigue on the part of the rebels and their NATO allies,
reversals in their military fortunes wouid signpost the end of the revoiution with
disastrous consequences on their lives as Gaddafi would have no pity for them'
Table }zNATO's Operation Unifi ed Protector (ouP) statistics
Action
Commenced ot 23 March 20llThe Arms
112025 MarchonCommencedZorreThe No-.
Commenced on 31 March 2011Protection of Civilians
UNtheS ofChaunder evenmandated pterwasOUP
andJ970 97ResolutionsCouncilI.IN SecurityCharter.
relate to NAIO's mission.2009
refuellers, unmanned aeriai vehicles and attack helico
27 naval as sets (supply ships, frigates, destroyers,
submarines, amphibious assault ships







strike700 sortiesx9overver s00o sorties, including26,
to andintended appropriateengageStrike identify
munitions each time.
Air Missions
Destroyed over 5,900 military targets
artillery or rocket launchers and over
including over 400
600 tanks or armored
vehicles.
surveillance area of around 61;000
nautical square miles. Over 3,100 vessels have been hailed'
Around 300 vessels have been bo arded- Eleven ships have
been denied transit to or from Llbyan,ports becaxse the
Covered a maritime
a risk to the civilianvessel or its






NATO maritime assets have aided the ressue of over
Unihed Protector.
directly
in distress at sea600
Safety of Life at Sea
paid the costs resulting from the
use of their capabilities deployed as part of Operation
Uniired Protector. Airborne Earl1'Warning and Control
Aircraft (AWACS) were the only NATO -owned capabilities
subject to NATO colruron funding. The total cost of the
24/7 deployment of NATO AWACS were estimatedat5'4
million EUR,/month. In addition, the complementary cost
for the structural and pe<sonnel augmentation of
headquarters involved in Operation Unif,red Protector was
estimited at 800,000 EUR/month, subject to final
Each contributing nation
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The NATO intervention in the Libyan revolution was not an isolated case. It fits
into the jigsaw of the new imperialistic framework of eliminating anti-Western regimes
and installing pro-Western regimes. For instance, former President Laurent Gbafbo of
Cote d'Ivoire was overthrown by the French Forces and in his stead, Alassane Ouittara
was installed. The French made sure that Gbagbo was removed from circuiation by
arresting and handing him over for prosecution for human rights crimes (N4adunagu
2011). The commitment of enormous resources by NATO in the campaign to remove
Gaddaft and the urgency that characterized its Operation unifed Protectoiwderscored
]-ibya's strategic importance. For sure, Llbyais important in the North African region.
Libya's importance iies in its strategic geographic location: it is bounded by- the
Mediterranean in the North; Tunisia and Algeria in the West; Chad in the Southiand,
Sudan, Southern Sudan and Egypt in the East. It also holds Africa's largest proven oii
reserve, some 35 percent larger than Nigeria. Therefore, to Pentagon's AFRICOM long-
term strategy, access to Libya guarantees access to controlling Africa and its resources
(Engdahl 201 I ).
It has been suggested that the overriding consideration in NATO's new
imperialism is to cut short China's increasing influence in Africa. As Engdahl (2011)
opines:
NATo's Libya campaign was and is alr about oil. But not about
simply controlling Libyan high-grade crude because rhe uSA is
nervous about reliable foreign supplies. It rather is about
controlling china's free access to long-term oil imports from
Africa and from the Middle East. In other words, it is about
controlling China itseif.
The unfolding NATO involvement in Africa is reminiscent of the 1884 Berlin
Colonial Conference where Africa was divided into the dominant European powers of
that epoch. What the so-called liberation of Libya means is that the Wesi has opened an
unfettered access in the institutionalizatron of its rmprimatur of dominan... prio, to
now, Gaddafihad stood in the way of the West, blocking the concretization of its
objective of a unified military command under the auspices of AFRICoM.
NATO's immediate achievement in the Llbyan campalgn appeared to be the
extension of the success that AFRICOM has made. Dr J. Peter Pham said that
AFRICOM's objectives included among others the task of "protecting access to
hydrocarbons and other strategic resources which Africa has in abundanie ... a task
which includes ensuring agarnst the r''ulnerability of those natural riches and ensuring
that no other interested third parties, such as China, India, Iapan, or Russia, obtain
monopolies or preferential treatment" (cited in Engdaht 2011). The oil concessions
which Gaddafi granted to Chinese state oil companies as well as Russia and others in
recent years appearedto have undermined this major western objective.
The second objective of NATO in Libya was to secure a pedestal for its military
operations. The Gulf of Sidra has been atheatre of skirmishes since 1973 between the
US and Libya. The Gulf of Sidra is a body of water in the Mediterranean Sea on the
northern coast of Llbya. According to Wikipedi a,the gurlf measures 273 mlles(439 km)
from the promontory of Boreum (now Ras Teyonas) on the East side to the promontory
of Cephalae (Ras Kasr Hamet) on the West. The greatest extension of the gulf intand is
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110 miles (180km) (http:/ /en.wikipedia.org /wlkt/Gulf-of-sidra). Irt 1973, Gaddafi
drew a line on the gulf which he cailed TheLine of Death, the crossing of which u'ou1d
elicit military action. He claimed much of the gulf by drawing a closing ltne at -32
degrees, 30 minutes north between a point near Bengh azi andthe Western headland at
Misrata with an exclusive fishing zone (EFZ) of 62 nautical miles
(http:/ /en.wikipedia.org /wlki/Gdf-olSidra; CIA World Factbook)' The US
.oriia.r.d part 
^of 
the aria clarmed by Gaddafi as part of the international waters based
on standard l2-mlle territorial limit from a country's shores and authorized Navai
exercises in the gulf to conduct freedom of navigation (FON) operations. This c1a^sh of
interest put the LiUyu, and US forces on a recurrent collision course which manifested
in military skirmishes in 197 3, 1 980, 1 98 1, 1986 and 1989'
The overthrow of Gaddafi by NATO forces means that "Llbya has become a
colony of the politicai principals of NATO, that is, America and the European Union
(EU), with the former e"ercisirrg hegemony in a 'collective imperialism"' (Madunagu
)Of ij. Another achievement of NetO is the creation of the psyche of dependence and
gratirttde in the new regimes in Libya for the foreseeabie fufure, which would
ireferentially open the floodgate of the oil economy to them and 
their allies. And fina11y,
the NATO success in Libya has ensured the opening of the Mediteffaneancoast and the
di:sert for the setting up military bases to ensure "the flow of oil in the 'right' direction, in
the'right' quantity and at'correct' prices " (Madunagu 20 1 1 )'
Conclusion
Although Gaddafi had been swept away by the Libyan revolution, it was the
coalition of western powers rather than the peopie of Lrbya that achieved that feat.
While Llbyais free of Gaddafi, it is not free of the stranglehold of capitalist interest of
NATO countries. Libya will have to contend with the quest for another kind of freedom;
that is, national freedom to carve its own path of development outside the Euro-
American orthodoxy. NATO's role in ousting Gaddafi. was motivated by high
economics: the economics of access to Libya's Sweet crude as weli aS access to the
Mediterranean coast and the desert for military bases. In ousting Gaddafi, Lib-va has
been brought under the umbrella of new imperialism that converts resource-richness
into curses through concessions and other exploitative stlategies.
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